Attitude change revisited: Cognitive dissonance theory and development policy. by James, M.J. & Gutkind, E.
World  Lkvrlopmerzf,  Vol.  13. No.  10111,  pp.  1139-1149,  1985.  03OS-7soxMs  $3.00  +  0.00 
Printed  in Great  Britain.  0  1985  Pergamon  Press  Ltd. 
Attitude  Change  Revisited:  Cognitive  Dissonance 
Theory  and  Development  Policy 
JEFFREY  JAMES* 
Boston  University 
and 
EFRAIM  GUTKIND 
International  Labor  Office,  Geneva 
Summary.  -This  paper  extends  earlier  work  done  by  Hirschman  on  the  potential  usefulness  of 
cognitive  dissonance  theory  for  explaining  the  process  of  attitude  change  in  the  course  of 
economic  development.  According  to this  theory  attitude  change  may  follow  rather  than  precede 
a change  in behavior.  The  paper  shows  that  an examination  of the  specific  conditions  under  which 
this  may  occur  can  throw  light  on  the  success  and  failure  of  particular  development  policies. 
Successful  outcomes  appear  to  have  been  produced  by  policies  that  paid  close  attention  to  the 
subtle  psychological  requirements  for  effecting  counter-attitudinal  behavior  with  a  minimum 
amount  of  perceived  pressure. 
Cognitive  dissonance  theory  has  found  wide- 
spread  applications  in  marketing.  social  psych- 
ology  and.recently,  its  implications  for  economic 
theory  have  been  explored.’  Apart  from  the 
treatment  given  to  it  by  Hirschman,  in  various 
contexts  and  at  different  times,  the  theory  has, 
however,  been  totally  ignored  in  development 
studies.2  We  believe  that  this  is  a  regrettable 
state  of  affairs,  especially  since  the  dissonance 
formulation  has  certain  direct  and  important 
implications  for  the  design  of  policies  to  promote 
the  kinds  of  attitude  change  (i.e.  change  in 
values,  tastes,  beliefs  and  attitudes)  that  are 
known  to  be  essential  for  the  process  of  develop- 
ment.  The  purpose  of  this  paper,  accordingly,  is 
to  analyze  some  of  the  developmental  implica- 
tions  of  this  well-established  theory  and,  through 
an  interpretation  of  a  selected  set  of  policies  in 
the  light  of  these  implications,  to  suggest  areas 
for  improvement  in  policy-making. 
Following  a  summary  of  Hirschman’s  original 
analysis  of  the  issue,  we  indicate  the  respects  in 
which  it is proposed  to  extend  his  analysis.  In  the 
next  section,  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  the 
paper  are  presented.  This  is  followed  by  a  set  of 
empirical  applications  of  the  argument,  on  the 
basis  of  which  certain  policy  implications  can  be 
drawn. 
1.  HIRSCHMAN’S  ANALYSIS 
Hirschman  was  the  first  to  draw  attention  to 
the  implications  of  cognitive  dissonance  theory 
for  the  process  of  attitude  change  in  develop- 
ment,  and  in  particular  to  the  key  implication  of 
the  theory,  that  a change  in  attitudes  mayfollow, 
rather  than  precede  behavioral  change.  Thus, 
the  theory  states  that  a  person  who,  for  some 
reason,  commits  himself  to act  in a manner  contrary 
to  his  beliefs,  or  to  what  he  believes  to  bc  his 
beliefs,  is  in  a  state  of  dissonance.  Such  a  state  is 
unpleasant,  and  the  person  will  attempt  to  reduce 
dissonance.  Since  the  discrepant  behavior  has 
already  taken  place  and  cannot  be  undone.  while 
the  belief  can  be  changed,  reduction  of  dissonance 
can  be  achieved  principally  by  changing  one’s 
beliefs  in  the  direction  of  greater  harmony  with  the 
action 
Dissonance  theory  deals  with  the  possibility  of 
replacing  the  “orderly”  sequence,  where  attitude 
change  is conceived  as the  prerequisite  to  behavior- 
al  change,  by  a  “disorderly  one,”  where  modern 
attitudes  are  acquired  ex-post,  as a  consequence  of 
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the  dksonancc  aroused  hy  “modern”  type  of  lx- 
havior  which  happens  to  he  engaged  in  by  people 
with  non-modern  attitudes.’ 
The  problem  is.  of  course,  one  of  inducing 
such  behavior  on  the  part  of  people  whose 
attitudes  are  fundamentally  in  conflict  with  it. 
For  Hirschman,  however,  “this  is  not  much  of  a 
problem  among  luir  coming  societies  surrounded 
by  modernity  and  by  opportunities  to  transgress 
into  or  try  out  modern  behavior;  at  one  time  or 
another,  it  is  likely  that  the  latecomer  will 
stumble  more  or  less  ub.si~nt-r7lirtci~~~ll~  itlto  sd~ 
hehuvior  as  pursuit  of  individual  profit.  entre- 
preneurial  risk-taking,  promotion  according  to 
merit,  long  term  planning,  holding  of  democratic 
elections,  etc.;  dissonance  will  thus  arise  and  will 
then  gradually  lead  to  those  changes  in  attitude 
and  basic  beliefs  which  were  thought  to  be 
prerequisites  to  the  just-mentioned  modes  of 
behavior.“’  The  role  of  government,  accordingly, 
is  primarily  to  promote  the  extent  to  which 
individuals  are  able  to  “engage  in  these 
dissonance-arousing  actions  and  in  inducing  ini- 
tial  commitment  to  them.” 
Hirschman’s  analysis  does  not.  however,  ade- 
quately  incorporate  the  fact  that  the  inducement 
of  “dissonance-arousing  actions”  by  government 
can  -  and  indeed  often  does  -  take  a  wide 
variety  of  forms,  ranging  from  mild  encourage- 
ment  on  the  one  hand,  to  outright  coercion  on 
the  other.  It  is  the  contribution  of  dissonance 
theory  to  show  that  these  alternatives,  and  the 
precise  manner  in  which  they  are  effected.  will 
have  very  different  implications  for  the  extent  to 
which  a  favorable  change  in  attitudes  can  be 
expected  to  accompany  induced  alterations  in 
behavior.  Our  concern  in  this  paper,  therefore,  is 
to  consider  in  more  detail  than  does  IIirschman, 
the  implications  of  the  theory  for  the  probable 
efficacy  of  government  policies  that  seek,  directly 
or  indirectly,  to  induce  people  to  alter  their 
behavior.  For  this  it  is  necessary  to  consider  in 
some  detail  the  conditions  under  which  (i) 
cognitive  dissonance  will  be  aroused  by  certain 
types  of  behavior  change  and  (ii)  the  dissonance 
thus  aroused  will  be  dealt  with  by  an  accompany- 
ing  change  in  attitudes. 
2.  THE  CONDITIONS  FOR  ACCOMPANY- 
ING  ATTITUDE  CHANGE  CONSEQUENT 
UPON  BEHAVIORAL  CHANGE 
“According  to  the  dissonance  theory  analysis, 
behaving  in  a  manner  contrary  to  one’s  attitu- 
dinal  position  creates  dissonance,  which  can  be 
reduced  by  changing  one’s  attitudes  so  that  they 
become  more  consistent  with  the  behavior  en- 
gaged  in.“5  This  sequence,  however.  i\  by  no 
means  automatic  -  on  the  contrary,  dissonance 
theory  lays  down  a quite  specific  set  of  conditions 
that  must  be  fulfilled  in  order  for  it  to  occur.  In 
this  section  we  examine  the  nature  of  these 
conditions. 
There  are  two  distinct  stages  in  the  process  hy 
which  behavior  change  produces  a  favorable 
change  in  attitude  through  the  dissonance 
mechanism.  Each  stage  will  he  seen  to  give  rise  to 
a  necessary  condition  for  this  change  to  occur. 
Firstly,  it  is  necessary  that  the  behavioral  change 
actually  induces  dissonance  and  secondly,  it  is 
required  that  attitude  change  is  the  method  that 
is chosen  to  reduce  the  dissonance.  Together,  the 
two  sets  of  conditions  will  hc  sufficient  for  the 
required  attitude  change. 
(a)  ‘The conditions  for  tlissonrtnce  uromd 
The  basic  mechanism  that  induces  dissonance 
as  a  consequence  of  behavioral  change  is  one  of 
conflict.  and  in  particular.  the  conflict  between 
one’s  behavior  and  the  attitudes  that  one  holds. 
It  is the  extent  of  this  conflict  that  determines  the 
degree  of  dissonance  that  is  aroused.  This,  in 
turn,  will  depend  upon  the  conditions  governing 
the  behavioral  change  itself. 
Individuals  may  engage  in  behavior  which  is 
inconsistent  with  their  attitudes  for  a  variety  of 
reasons.  In  some  cases  this  may  occur  “by 
accident”  as  envisaged  in  Hirschman’s  case 
where  individuals  “stumble  more  or  less  absent- 
mindedly  into  such  behavior.”  In  most  cases. 
however,  the  discrepant  behavior  will  occur  as  a 
result  of  inducements  or  outright  coercion  (as 
when  the  hehavior  is  made  compulsory  by 
government).  These  different  types  of  motivation 
are  important  because  they  have  quite  different 
implications  for  the  amount  of  dissonance  that  is 
likely  to  he  aroused. 
Consider  first  the  extreme  case  where  the 
altered  behavior  is  entirely  due  to  coercion 
(which  is  known  in  the  dissonance  literature  as 
the  case  of  “forced  compliance”).  Here  little  or 
no  dissonance  will  result  since  the  behavior 
change  can  be  easily  dismissed  as  something  that 
“had  to  be  done”  and  for  which  the  individual 
consequently  bears’.  no  responsibility. 
A  similar  argument  applies  to  the  case  where 
behavioral  change  is  induced  not  by  outright 
coercion,  but  rather  by  some  form  of  incentive 
scheme.  In  general,  the  theory  predicts  that  the 
greater  the  incentives  under  which  the  behavioral 
change  takes  place  the  less  will  be  the  dissonance 
and  consequently  also  the  degree  of  attitude 
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more  easily  can  the  behavior  change  be  con- 
sidered  (in  a  way  that  is  analogous  to  forced 
compliance)  as  something  that  was  done  because 
of  the  circumstances  rather  through  an  act  of 
individual  volition.  And  lacking  the  volitional 
component,  the  behavior  change  fails  to  produce 
dissonance  or  a  change  in  attitudes. 
Firms  trying  to  promote  the  sales  of  new 
products  through  free  samples.  cut-price  offers, 
etc.  frequently  encounter  this  type  of  relationship 
between  attitudes  and  behavioral  change.  Thus 
the  more  incentives  are  used  to  induce  buyers  to 
change  their  behavior  patterns  (i.e.  to  switch  to 
the  new  brand)  the  less  likely  is  it  that  attitude 
change  in  favor  of  the  product  (and  hence  repeat 
purchasing)  will  ensue.”  Indeed,  from  this  point 
of  view,  it may  be  preferable  to  charge  something, 
than  offer  free  samples!  And  in  the  forced 
compliance  literature  numerous  experiments 
have  shown  that  the  greater  the  inducement  to 
make  a  public  statement  that  is  contrary  to  one’s 
private  opinion,  the  less  is the  resulting  change  in 
attitude  in  the  direction  of  the  view  expressed  in 
the  public  statement. 
What  the  above  discussion  suggests  as  a 
necessary  condition  for  dissonance  arousal, 
therefore,  is that  the  individual  experiences  some 
degree  of  choice  in  making  his  change  of  be- 
havior.  Even  if  this  condition  is  met,  and 
dissonance  is therefore  aroused,  however,  it does 
not  necessarily  follow  that  the  outcome  will  be  a 
change  in attitude.  For  what  is then  crucial  is how 
the  individual  chooses  to  reduce  the  dissonance 
that  is  aroused. 
(b)  The mode  of  dissonance  reduction 
“Dissonance  theory  is  nonspecific  with  regard 
to  the  mode  of  dissonance  reduction  used  by  the 
individual  after  dissonance  arousal.“’  That  is,  it 
makes  no  specific  prediction  as  to  whether 
dissonance  will  be  reduced  by  one  means  rather 
than  another.  What  the  theory  does  say,  how- 
ever,  is  that  in  general  the  individual  will  opt  for 
the  mode  of  dissonance  reduction  that  offers  the 
least  resistance. 
Consider  the  example  of  the  smoker  who 
experiences  dissonance  because  the  act  of  smok- 
ing  is  inconsistent  with  his  knowledge  that  it  is 
bad  for  his  health.  Because  it  is  very  difficult  for 
him  to  deny  that  the  habit  is bad  for  his  health,  he 
may  instead  attempt  to  reduce  dissonance  by 
arguing  that  if  he  stopped  smoking  he  would  put 
on  weight  which  is  equally  bad  for  his  health. 
It  follows  that  if  attitude  change  is  to  follow 
discrepant  behavior  change  as  the  chosen  mode 
of  reducing  the  dissonance  occasioned  by  the 
latter,  it  must  offer  less  resistance  than  other 
possible  modes,  perhaps  the  most  obvious  of 
which  is  attempting  to  revert  to  behavior  that  is 
more  in  line  with  one’s  attitudes.  The  question  is 
then  whether  it  is  easier  to  alter  one’s  new 
behavior  or  one’s  old  attitudes.  Among  the 
crucial  determinants  of  this  choice  are,  firstly,  the 
degree  of  irrevocability  of  the  former,  e.g., 
whether  or  not  the  individual  would  incur  sizable 
financial  losses  from  “uncommitting”  himself 
from  his  new  behavioral  commitment.  The  diffi- 
culty  of  changing  one’s  attitudes  -  the  second 
major  determinant  -  depends,  on  the  one  hand, 
on  how  entrenched  these  have  become  and  on 
the  other  hand,  on  how  much  social  support  one 
has  in  changing  them.’ 
3.  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY 
In  the  previous  section  we  examined  the 
conditions  under  which  a  change  in  behavior 
produces  an  accommodating  attitude  change. 
Brehm  and  Cohen  have  summed  up  the  implica- 
tions  of  these  conditions  for  social  policy  in  the 
following  way. 
The  strongest  effects  on  attitudes  and 
subsequent  behavior  are  produced  when  careful 
thought  is  given  to  the  conditions  under  which 
people  are  forced  to  comply  with  the  demand  that 
they  do  something  they  do  not  want  to  do.  Changes 
in  attitudes,  and  so  forth,  away  from  an  initial 
position  one  has  held,  toward  a  new  and  originally 
unpleasant  position,  depend  certainly  on  first 
arranging  the  social  conditions  that  elicit  the  new 
and  recalcitrant  response.  However,  it is rhe  ~WWW 
in  which  the environment  is organized  in getting  the 
person  into the new situation,  or  m-ranged  once  he  is 
in it, rhar determines  how  well he  will adjust  to if by 
accepting  it,  incorporating  it,  rationalizing  if,  and, 
finally,  even  proselytizing  for  it.’ 
Because  many,  if  not  most,  development 
policies  are  designed  eventually  to  alter  the 
behavior  of  certain  members  of  poor  societies  in 
ways  that  conflict  with  the  (often  traditional) 
attitudes  held  by  these  individuals,  we  believe 
that  this  statement  has  relevance  also  for  this 
area  of  policy-making.  Through  an  interpretation 
of  some  of  these  policies  in  the  light  of  the 
analysis  in  the  previous  section,  we  shall  there- 
fore  attempt  to  throw  light  on  their  frequently 
observed  failure  (as  well  as  occasional  successes) 
to  produce  accommodating  attitude  change,  and 
in  this  way  to  indicate  the  direction  future 
policies  might  take  in  order  to  raise  their  chances 
of  success  in  this  respect. 
The  above  analysis  of  the  necessary  conditions 
for  accommodating  attitude  change  resultant upon  behavior  change,  suggests  two  major  prob- 
lems  for  development  planners.  The  first  is  how 
to  induce  a  change  in  behavior  without  at  the 
same  time  negating  the  conditions  for  the  arousal 
of  dissonance.  Thus,  “While  it  is  necessary  to 
have  a  minimum  of  . extrinsic  motivations  in 
order  to  obtain  compliance  the  strength  of 
any  of  these  forces  beyond  the  minimum  makes  a 
great  deal  of  difference  in  ultimate  attitude 
change.““’  In  other  words,  what  policy-makers 
confront  is  a  vicious  circle;  getting  people  to 
engage  in  dissonance-arousing  activities  would 
seem  to  require  coercion  or  strong  incentives  but 
the  very  use  of  these  methods  defeats  the 
objective  of  engendering  sufficient  dissonance  to 
produce  a  change  in  attitudes. 
One  way  for  policy  to  overcome  this  YYatch 
22”  is  to  make  use  of  group  pressure,  which. 
under  some  circumstances,  may  appear  as  less 
coercive  than  pressure  exerted  directly  on  indi- 
viduals  from  above.  These  favorable  circum- 
stances  seem  to  arise  when  the  individual  feels 
part  of  a  cohesive  group,  whose  norms  he 
(therefore)  likes  to  live  up  to  and  in  whose 
decisions  he  takes  some  active  role.”  Group 
change  will  then  tend  to  be  easier  to  effect  than 
change  of  individuals  considered  separately. 
During  the  Second  World  War.  for  example. 
psychologists  who  were  seeking  the  best  way  to 
convince  housewives  to  buy  unfamiliar  types  of 
foods,  found  that  “More  housewives  changed 
their  behavior  and  attitudes  about  various  types 
of  foods  after  participating  in  a  group  discussion 
than  after  hearing  a lecture  on  the  value  of  eating 
these  same  new  foods.  Once  the  new  group 
standard  had  been  formed  through  group  discus- 
sion,  it  was  easier  for  the  housewives  to  change 
their  behavior  to  conform  to  the  new 
standard.“” 
Much  the  same  use  of  peer  pressure  in  small 
groups  (him-tsu)  appears  to  have  been  made  for 
the  purpose  of  mobilizing  the  Chinese  population 
during  the  Maoist  period.  But  as  Whyte  has 
pointed  out.  effective  use  of  this  type  of  pressure 
demanded  an  extremely  subtle  blend  of 
psychological  forces.  which  was  not  at  all  easy  to 
establish.  In  particular, 
Mutual  criticism  in  a  sense  is  the  prime  motive 
force  behind  attitude  change in  /~slcra-t.s~; as such  it 
was  extremely  important  that  mutual  criticism  and 
the  atmosphere  surrounding  it  be  correct.  The 
desired  atmosphere  was  one  quite  different  from 
that  valued  in  traditional  Chinese  primary  groups. 
The  terms  used  convey  this  point.  What  was  desired 
was  a  “happy,  tense,  lively  atmosphere,” 
“solidarity  but  not  harmony,”  Thus  a new  kind 
of  unity  was  to  develop.  one  based  on  rigorous 
group  criticism  rather  than  on the smoothing  over  of 
conflict  in  order  to  prcscrve  harmony  (the  1r:ld- 
tional  emphasis).  On  the  other  hand.  I~titro-/.\rt wcrc 
not  supposed  to  hc  the  sccnc  ot  rclcntless  and 
merciless  criticism.  which  would  serve  only  to 
alienate  memhcrs.  Solidarity  and  criticism  wcrc  to 
hc  combined,  with  criticism  Lading  not  to  dishar- 
mony  hut  to improved  unity  As  those  criticized 
acknowledged  their  defects  and  resolved  to  chnngc 
their  ways,  unity  was  restored.  hut  at a hi!hrr  level 
(i.e.,  with  the  defects  corrected).  0~1~  rf  cri/icitn~ 
wu5 IIro~~erlv  hulancrd  wilh  group  solidwily  codti  II 
he  c~~wivein  changing  rhr  u/ri/cuie.v  of  rrwrdxw.  ’ ’ 
A  second  way  in  which  policy  may  be  able  to 
overcome  the  vicious  circle  described  above  is 
through  use  of  the  so-called  “foot-in-the-door 
technique.”  This  technique  of  producing  com- 
pliance  with  a  minimal  amount  of  apparent 
pressure,  is based  on  the  assumption  that  “once  ;I 
person  has  been  induced  to  comply  with  a small 
request  he  is  more  likely  to  comply  with  a larger 
demand.“”  One  of  the  most  interesting  and 
widespread  applications  of  the  foot-in-the-door 
approach  is  to  be  found  in  sales  campaigns  that 
attempt  to  engage  the  consumer  in  even  the  most 
minor  forms  of  initial  involvement  with  the 
product  (such  as  sending  back  a  card  indicating 
that  he  does  not  want  the  product). 
Even  if  policy-makers  are  able  successfully  to 
employ  techniques  of  peer  pressure  and  gradual 
persuasion  to  bring  about  temporary  counter- 
attitudinal  behavior,  they  will  still,  however.  face 
the  problem  of  ensuring  that  this  behavior 
persists  and  for  this  more  sustained  behavioral 
alteration  a  fundamental  change  in  attitudes  is 
generally  likely  to  be  necessary.  The  point  can 
usefully  be  illustrated  with  reference  to  the 
distinction  that  Brehm  and  Cohen  draw  between 
what  is  required  for  racial  desegregation  on  the 
one  hand  and  more  fundamental  racial  integra- 
tion  on  the  other.  As  they  put  it. 
It  is  true  that  many  of  the  advocates  of  desegrcga- 
tlon  feel  that  it  docs  not  matter  ~r+~crt  people’\ 
attitudes  arc or  /ION, they  react so  long  as desegrcga- 
tion,  and therefore  racial  quality.  is  brought  about. 
But.  ii  one  is  oriented  toward  the  long  view.  and 
takes  the  position  that  desegrcgatlon  is  after  all  the 
first  step  toward  integration.  he  should  examine 
thoroughly  the  conditions  under  wjhich  desegrega- 
tion  takes  pl~e.‘~ 
In  general.  policy-makers  need  to  ensure  that 
attitude  change  is  the  preferred  (i.e.  least-cost) 
mode  of  dissonance  reduction  (assuming,  as  we 
are.  that  the  change  in  behavior  has  been 
accompanied  by  a  relatively  high  degree  of 
dissonance).  Policies  for  this  can  take  the  form 
either  of  making  “uriccommitment”  of  behavior 
difficult,  or  of  facilitating  accommodating  atti- 
tude  change,  or  both  of  these.  Achievement  of  the ATTITUDE  CHANGE  REVISITED  1143 
former  can  be  promoted  by  ensuring  that  the 
policy  underlying  the  induced  behavior  is  firm 
and  irrevocable  and  the  latter  by  mobilizing 
village  leaders  or  other  authority  figures  to 
sanction  the  accommodating  attitude  change,  for 
it  is  a  fundamental  proposition  of  dissonance 
theory  that  “dissonance  will  be  resolved  via 
positive  attitude  change  to  the  degree  that 
such  positive  attitudes are  socially  sanctioned.  “” 
How  successfully  the  actual  practice  of  devel- 
opment  has  dealt  with  these  problems  will  be  the 
subject  of  the  following  section,  in  which  we 
present  case-study  material  from  a  variety  of 
different  areas  of  policy-making. 
4.  POLICY  CASE  STUDIES 
(a)  Population  policy 
For  a  time,  it  seemed  reasonable  to  those 
concerned  with  policies  for  family  planning,  that 
initial  acceptance  of  family  planning  methods 
meant  satisfaction  and,  furthermore,  that  initial 
acceptance  and  other  short-term  indicators  were 
closely  associated  with  long-term  use.  r’ 
Subsequent  findings,  however,  belied  the  view 
that  success  in  family  planning  methods  could  be 
usefully  measured  by  acceptor  rates.  In  particu- 
lar,  it  was  found  that  continuation  rates  “were 
extremely  low  in  studies  from  several  dozen 
selected  countries.“‘x 
These  later  findings  are  consistent  with  the 
dissonance  approach,  which,  in  general,  predicts 
that  a change  in  behavior  (in  this  case  acceptance 
of  contraceptive  methods)  may  or  may  not  be 
associated  with  a  corresponding  attitude  change 
and  that  there  is no  necessity  for  acceptor  rates  to 
be  highly  correlated  with  long-run  success. 
According  to  the  theory,  the  change  in  attitude 
-  and  consequently  the  degree  of  continuation 
-  depends  crucially  on  the  precise  manner  in 
which  the  initial  change  in  behavior  is  effected. 
Consider  the  case  of  the  individual  with  an 
initially  unfavorable  attitude  towards  family 
planning.  The  problem  is  not  only  to  secure 
behavior  on  the  part  of  the  individual  that  is 
inconsistent  with  his/her  initial  attitude,  but  also 
to  secure  a sustained  change  in behavior  which,  in 
turn,  demands  a  change  in  attitude.  A  major 
problem  is  that  even  if  the  first  hurdle  can  be 
overcome  and  the  initial  behavior  change  is 
achieved  (so  that  dissonance  is  aroused),  it  can 
all  too  easily  be  dispelled  by  reversion  to  one’s 
initial  behavior.  That  is,  without  some  degree  of 
commitment  to  the  new  mode  of  behavior, 
behavior  rather  than  attitude  change  is  likely  to 
be  the  preferred  mode  of  dissonance  reduction. 
An  example  from  a  contraceptive  distribution 
scheme  in  Bangladesh  illustrates  the  problems. 
In  1975  all  married  women  of  reproductive  age 
were  given  information  on  and  offered  a  supply 
of  oral  contraceptives.  If  they  accepted,  they 
were  given  a  supply  of  six  cycles.  However,  the 
women  were  not  asked  to  commit  themselves  to 
using  the  contraceptives.  Though  contraceptive 
use  rose  quite  sharply  during  the  following  ear, 
the  dropout  rate  was  reported  to  be  high.  Xl At 
least  part  of  the  reason  for  this  may  have  been 
the  lack  of  commitment  -  and  the  consequent 
ease  of  using  “uncommitment,”  rather  than  atti- 
tude  change,  as  a mode  of  dissonance  reduction. 
Similar  problems  of  securing  sustained  be- 
havioral  change  are  often  encountered  in  policies 
for  compulsory  education.  With  respect  to  the 
Chilean  case,  for  example,  Anderson  and  Bow- 
man  report  that  despite  the  existence  of  legal 
compulsory  primary  education,  “There  is  a  very 
heavy  rate  of  school  desertion  .  .  in  direct 
violation  of  the  law.“20  With  poor  enforcement  of 
the  law,  it  is  all  too  easy  to  reduce  dissonance- 
arousing  behavior,  by  changing  the  behavior 
itself. 
As  noted  in  the  previous  section,  attitude 
change  may  also  fail  to  occur  because  of  the  way 
in  which  coercive-type  methods  are  used  to  bring 
about  the  initial  change  in  behavior.  This  prob- 
lem,  too,  can  be  illustrated  in  the  context  of 
incentive  policies  for  family  planning. 
Many  developing  countries  have  experimented 
with  incentives  of  various  kinds  in  the  promotion 
of  family  planning  practices.  In  some  cases, 
incentives  are  provided  to  those  responsible  for 
promoting  birth  control  in  the  field,  who  are 
often  referred  to  as  canvassers.  This  has  led,  on 
occasion,  to  results  quite  contrary  to  the  objec- 
tives  of  the  programs.  In  particular,  canvassers 
have  used  a  high  degree  of  coercion  to  secure 
behavior  change  (e.g.  through  vasectomies).  As 
a  result,  respondents  have  continued  to hold  an 
unfavorable  attitude towards  vasectomy  even  after 
adoption.  And,  ‘Such  adopters  are  likely  to 
spread  unfavorable  rumors  about  vasectomy. 
The  result  is an  eventual  plateau  effect  in  the  rate 
of  adoption.  .  .  A  dissatisfied  customer  who 
adopted  because  of  pressure  from  a  canvasser  is 
the  worst  kind  of  interpersonal  advertisement, 
for  an  innovation.“2’  (Note  here  that  a  similar 
outcome  may  be  predicted  by  dissonance  theory 
if,  without  actual  coercion,  incentives  are  very 
high.) 
Rogers  concludes  his  analysis  of  the  efficacy  of 
incentives  for  family  planning  with  a  plea  for 
enriched  “understanding  of  the  sociopsycho- 
logical  process  of  persuasion  and  innovation 
decision  making  through  which  incentives  have I I-14  WORLD  DEVELOPMEN’I- 
an  effect.  How  individuals  pcrccive  incentives 
and  how  such  perceptions  structure  their  motiva- 
tion  and  affect  their  decisions  arc  not  yet 
known.  “” 
All  of  the  above  has  been  concerned  with  the 
second  main  question  noted  at  the  start  of  this 
section,  namely,  whether  or  not  attitude  change 
accompanies  behavioral  change  (which  assumes 
that  the  latter  has  actually  been  secured).  But  in 
the  field  of  policies  for  family  planning.  securing 
the  initial  desired  behavior  change  has  often 
proved  very  difficult.  Indeed.  “Field  experience 
clearly  indicates  that  attacking  values.  on  the  one 
hand,  or  making  structural  changes  on  the  other, 
is  not  always  sufficient  to  change  behavior.“” 
That  is,  while  non-coercive  methods  of  securing 
behavior  change  have  often  failed,  methods  that 
are  “too  coercive”  also,  as  we  have  seen,  may  fail 
to  achieve  the  attitude  changes  that  are  required 
for  a  sustained  improvement  in  methods  of  birth 
control. 
In  the  above,  WC‘  argued  that  the  dissonance 
formulation  is  able  to  throw  light  on  certain 
instances  of  failure  in the  field  of  family  planning. 
We  also  believe  that  the  theory  provides  B useful 
framework  within  which  aspects  of  the  succesful 
Chinese  experience  in  this  area  can  be  undcr- 
stood. 
As  Leo  Orleans  has  pointed  out,  the  Chinese 
effort  to  introduce  birth  control  to  the  population 
had  to  overcome  virtually  all the  problems  that 
are  typically  encountered  by  other  developing 
countries,  namely,  “traditional  values  with  re- 
gard  to  family,  the  desire  for  children,  an 
attitude  toward  sex  that  inhibited  open  discussion 
of  the  subject.  the  traditional  subservient  role  of 
the  woman.“”  IIe  also  indicates  that  with  respect 
to  the  delivery  system  that  the  Chinese  used  to 
solve  these  problems,  there  is little  that  is  new  to 
family  planning  specialists.  What  does  distinguish 
the  Chinese  approach  appears  to  be  its  motiva- 
tional  aspect  and  we  shall  offer  a  dissonance 
theory  interpretation  of  this  experience. 
The  essence  of  the  motivational  system  that  is 
applied  to  population  control  is  peer  pressure. 
This  pressure  is felt  both  at  the  workplace  and  at 
the  residential  level.  With  respect  to  the  former. 
The  involvement  of  the  man~~gcmcnt  and  01  the 
workers  and  cmployec\  or  pcas;mta  ,n  the  personal 
lives  of  each  individtml  extends  consideraldy 
beyond  work-rcl;lted  subjects  study topic 
related  to  family  planning  are common.  It is  not 
unusual  for  the  women  worker\  in  ;i  factory.  for 
example,  to  ~~nnouncc‘  their  joint  dcciaion  :is  to  the 
number  of  births  they  will  collectively  hsvc  tlurtng 
the  following  year.  or  to  wc  ii  chart  on  the  wall  of  ii 
ho+t;d  or  an  office? 
The  focus  of  peer  pressure  at  the  residential 
level  is the  basic  level  cadre  whose  function  is to 
personally  guide  and  continually  assist  mothers 
and  potential  mothers.  In  some  cases,  the  degree 
of  involvement  of  the  local  community  in  the 
choice  of  family  size  is such  that  debates  are  held 
to  discuss  which  families  would  have  children 
during  forthcoming  years.  As  a  consequence  of 
these  powerful  pressures  that  are  brought  to  bear 
on  the  Chinese  population  it  used  to  be  the  case 
that  “a  couple  that  has  too  many  children  not 
only  rejects  Mao’s  wishes  but  disgraces  its  own 
group  or  community.““’ 
One  of  the  striking  aspects  of  the  way  in  which 
the  Chinese  confronted  the  intractable  problem 
of  “traditional  attitudes”  in  birth  control  as  well 
as  in  other  areas  during  the  Maoist  period  is that 
it  appears  to  conform  quite  closely  to  what  the 
theory  described  in  the  previous  section  would 
require  for  favorable  attitude  change  to  accom- 
pany  prior  alterations  in  behavior.  (Indeed.  as 
Whyte”  points  out,  much  of  the  reasoning 
presented  in  political  pamphlets  parallels  closely 
the  findings  of  Western  social  psychologists, 
although  the  pamphlets  do  not  cite  these  findings 
and  do  not  discuss  the  issues  in  the  same  terms.) 
In  particular,  the  Chinese  laid  great  stress  on  the 
need  to  avoid  behavioral  change  through  forced 
compliance.  “Indirect  pressure,  persuasion.  and 
the  force  of  example  should  bc  emphasized  and 
commands  and  threats  de-emphasizcd.“~”  That 
is.  behavioral  change  was  to be  brought  about  in 
a  manner  that  would  arouse  dissonance  on  the 
part  of  those  whose  initial  attitudes  were 
inconsistent  with  the  change.  For  this  purpose,  as 
noted  earlier,  the  Chinese  leaders  relied  heavily 
on  the  peer  pressure  that  was  exerted  through  the 
small  group,  achieving  in  this  way,  what  often 
appears  as  paradoxical  about  the  Maoist  develop- 
ment  model,  namely,  the  combination  of 
regimentation  and  mass  enthusiasm.  “To  the 
Western  mind  (these)  seem  quite  contradictory. 
or  attainable  only  in  very  special  organizations 
with  highly  selected  participants  (perhaps  in  a 
monastery).“‘”  But  it  is  important  to  note  that  in 
the  use  of  this  method  the  Chinese  were  not 
always  successful  in  achieving  the  ideal  type  of 
small  group  structure  which  was  described  in  the 
theoretical  section  above  and  through  which 
compliance  could  be  secured  with  a  minimum  of 
apparent  pressure.  As  Whyte  has  pointed  out. 
In  so*nc  organizations  indwidu;rls  do  feel  prcswrc 
from  peers  whom  they  rc\pcct  to  change  their 
attitudes.  and  find  the  prwpcct  of  “f;dling  hehind” 
hard  to  hear.  Rut  in  wmc  other  or~;lniz;ltion~~I ATTITUDE  CHANGE  REVISITED  1145 
settings  individuals  feel  they  are  surrounded  by 
opportunists  waiting  to  criticize  their  slightest  mis- 
step  in  order  to  gain  favor  with  superiors.  In  other 
settings  individuals  look  upon  political  rituals  as  a 
bothersome  but  unavoidable  routine,  and  save  their 
energies  and  emotions  for  activities  outside  the 
group.  In  these  and  other  ways  the  ideal  strict 
political  atmosphere  is  not  achieved.  and  the 
psychological  impact  of  group  activities  is reduced. 
or  cvcn  reversed.3” 
In  terms  of  dissonance  theory,  all  these  diffi- 
culties  may  be  said  to  have  the  effect  of  frustrat- 
ing  the  attempt  to  produce  sustained  behavioral 
change  through  attitude  change  that  is  (intended 
to  be)  produced  via  (non-coercive)  peer  pressure 
in  the  small  groups.  And  as  a  consequence,  “In 
sustaining  high  commitments  and  efforts,  the 
elite  still  relies  upon  material  incentives  and 
sanctions  more  than  it would  apparently  like  to.” 
(b)  A micro  case-study:  The diffusion  of 
sanitation technology  in Mexico 
Several  of  the  elements  that  characterize  the 
general  Chinese  model  can  be  studied  in  opera- 
tion  at  the  micro-level  of  the  successful  introduc- 
tion  of  new  sanitation  technology  in  Yalcuc, 
Mexico. 
Latrines  were  first  introduced  into  Yalcuc 
about  20  years  ago  and  the  subsequent  experi- 
ence  in  that  community,  “is  an  example  of  rapid 
diffusion  and  adoption  of  an  innovation  in  a 
harmonious  manner  beneficial  to  the  ma- 
jority.“”  In  particular,  following  an  initial  adop- 
tion  rate  of  almost  90%,  the  rate  of  continuous 
use  over  the  ensuing  20-year  period  was  7.5%. 
Much  of  the  enduring  success  of  this  project 
appears  to  have  been  due  to  the  precise  manner 
in  which  it  was  first  implemented.  Specifically, 
the  decision  to  install  latrines  was  made  within  the 
context  of  a  community  project;  all  the  aura  of  the 
leadership  and  the  pressures  of  social  control  were 
brought  to  bear  on  the  villagers.  Gradually.  al/  the 
men  in  the  community  signed  an  agreemenl  in  a 
village  meeting  signifying  their  commitmenr  to  the 
collective  decision  10  install  the  latrines.  The 
decision  to  install  latrines  was  as  much  a  matter  of 
community  dynamics  as of  individual  decisionmak- 
ing.  The  costs  (in  money  and  time)  of  installing 
a  latrine  were  perceived  by  many  as  minor  com- 
pared  to  the  costs  (in  social  pressure,  loss of  good 
will,  and  deterioration  of  solidarity)  of  not  installing 
one.” 
In  contrast  to  the  contraceptive  distribution 
scheme  in  Bangladesh  referred  to  above  (where 
the  initial  change  in  behavior  was  not  sustained), 
what  appears  thus  to  have  occurred  in Yalcuc  was 
that  the  commitment  to  the  project  that  was 
jointly  enforced  through  group  pressure  and  in 
writing,  caused  attitude  change  to  be  the  prefer- 
red  mode  of  dissonance  reduction.  Peer  pressure 
in  this  case,  as  in  the  more  successful  Chinese 
examples,  appears  to  have  been  perceived  by 
participants  as something  much  less  coercive  than 
a  mere  directive  imposed  from  above.  Indeed, 
the  group  structure  that  was  employed  for  the 
purpose  of  diffusion  of  the  latrines  resembles  in 
key  respects  the  “ideal-type”  sought  by  the 
Chinese  leaders.  In  particular,  “Proposals  are 
discussed  thoroughly,  and  opposing  opinions  are 
heard  respectfully.  .  Never  is a vote  taken,  and 
as  a  result,  polarization  is  minimized.““’  And  in 
this  way  “The  concern  with  solidarity  is  sup- 
ported  by  a  system  of  social  pressure  to  comply 
with  collective  decisions  and 
the  norms  of  the  community.“3  $ 
enerally  follows 
Taken  together, 
these  aspects  of  the  way  in  which  the  project  was 
implemented,  helped  to  ensure  a  lasting  altera- 
tion  in  behavior,  as was  manifest  in  the  long-term 
continued  use  of  the  latrine. 
If,  therefore,  the  Yalcuc  sanitation  project 
provides  an  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  peer 
pressure  can  be  used  to  confront  the  problem  of 
securing  counter-attitudinal  behavior  with  a 
minimal  amount  of  perceived  coercion,  other 
apparently  successful  projects  in this  field  suggest 
that  attention  should  also  be  paid  to  the  potential 
of  the  alternative,  “foot-in-the-door”  (i.e.,  grad- 
ual  persuasion)  technique.  In  two  small  com- 
munities  in  rural  Guatemala,  for  example,  the 
initiators  of  the  project  managed  first  “to  gain  the 
allegiance  of  a  small  group  active  in  the  com- 
munity  and  capable  of  generating  community 
support.  The  commitment  of  the  rest  of  the 
community  members  was  obtained  in  a  gradual 
process  of  individual  persuasion 
leaders.““’ 
by  core 
(c)  Motivational  aspects of villagization in 
Tanzania 
Following  the  Arusha  Declaration  of  1967,  the 
government  of  Tanzania  embarked  on  a policy  of 
establishing  communally  organized  villages 
throughout  the  rural  areas  of  the  country  (the 
so-called  Ujamaa  village  scheme).  That  this 
policy  had  only  a very  limited  degree  of  success  is 
now  widely  acknowledged  and  in  this  section  we 
try  to  relate  certain  of  the  unsuccessful  aspects  of 
this  scheme  to  a  failure  to  comply  with  the 
afore-mentioned  conditions  for  favorable  atti- 
tude  change. 
In  seeking  to  foster  a new  type  of  organization 
of  rural  production,  the  government  confronted 
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tudes  that  were  rooted  in  a  long  tradition  of 
smallholder  agriculture.  And  this  problem  was 
dealt  with  in  two  different  ways.  On  the  one 
hand,  entirely  voluntary  means  of  persuasion 
were  used  and  on  the  other,  resort  was  made  to 
methods  of  outright  coercion.  Following  the 
predictions  of  dissonance  theory,  one  would 
expect  a  totally  different  outcome  from  the  two 
types  of  approach.  and  this  is  indeed  what 
occurred.  Thus, 
the  experience  of the  many  ujumuu  villages  through- 
out  the  country  shows  that  rllc  kev  IO  r/w  f~c~uw 
.sucwss  of  u  village  lies  it1 Ihe  wcq  il  Is  rr~ilicrrd.  and 
in the  motivation  of the  farmers  who c;lmc  togcthcr 
to  establish  the  vilklgc.  Idc;~lly.  this  beginning 
should  he entirely  spontaneous  Some  villagca 
which  indeed  started  in this w:iy benefit  enormously 
from  the  cohesion  and  mutual  conlidcnce  within  the 
community  which  ensue.  On  the  other  hand.  the 
expcriencc  where  forms  of coercion.  even  if reason- 
ably  subtle.  have  been  used  to  organize  U~U~PIUCI 
villages,  has  shown  the  extreme  difficulty  01 
promoting  cooperation  other  than  through  cntirel) 
voluntary  means  “’ 
In  one  district  where  coercive  methods  were 
employed  the  outcome  after  four  years  was  that 
‘*the  villages  remain  dependent  on  government 
assistance  and  have  made  very  little 
towards  social  or  economic  viability.”  37 
rogress 
Nor  was  it  only  with  respect  to  the  conditions 
under  which  the  initial  change  in  behavior  was 
brought  about  that  problems  with  the  motiva- 
tional  aspects  of  villagization  arose.  There  were 
failures  also  in  regard  to  policies  for  those 
farmers  who  had  already  made  the  change  to. 
and  were  working  in,  the  new  villages.  In 
particular.  inadequate  attention  appears  to  have 
been  paid  to  obtaining  the  commitment  to  the 
new  way  of  life,  that.  in  the  dissonance  formula- 
tion,  is  so  critical  to  obtaining  attitude  change. 
One  commentator  of  the  villagization  program. 
refers,  for  example.  to  the  feelings  of  insecurity 
that  were  aroused  by  doubts  as  to  whether 
lljur?laa  agriculture  was  really  “there  to  stay.“‘X 
Another  describes  a  group  of  villagers  as  retain- 
ing  “their  reservations  about  leaving  their  former 
homes  and  lands  in  the  valley.  Many  were 
watching  the  alternatives  open  to  them  carefully 
even  as  the 
? 
cut  their  way  through  the  thick 
thornbush.“.”  What  appears  to  have  been  lack- 
ing,  among  other  things,  was  the  operation  of  any 
mechanism  that  provided  social  pressure  of  the 
Chinese  small  group  type.  “What  was  needed 
was  a  mobilizing  agency  which  could  mediate 
between  the  goals  determined  by  the  state  and 
the  perhaps  understandable  but  nevertheless 
regrettable  reluctance  of  the  peasant.“J” 
In  many  developing  countries  doctors  are 
required  to  engage  in  temporary  health  work  in 
rural  areas  for  periods  of  typically  one  or  two 
years.  The  IL0  Mission  to  Colombia  recom- 
mended  that  “the  authorities  should  carefullv 
consider  a  possible  extension  of  the  period  of 
compulsory  rural  service,”  on  the  grounds  that 
“This  may  be  the  only  way  to  overcome  the 
existing  rural  scarcity.““’ 
In  the  short  run,  schemes  such  as  these.  will.  of 
course,  alleviate  the  problem,  but  in  the  longer 
term  their  negative  motivational  aspects  are 
likely  to  prove  counterproductive.  On  the  one 
hand.  as  Oftedal  and  Levinson  have  pointed  out. 
“The  doctors  almost  always  return  to  the  cities  at 
the  end  of  the  compulsory  service.“”  What  is 
worse,  the  attitudes  of  the  returning  doctors  to 
rural  service  often  seem  to  become  even  more 
unfavorable  as  a  direct  result  of  the  rural  service 
itself. 
Dissonance  theory  would  interpret  these  re- 
sults  in  the  following  way.  Firstly,  they  may  be 
seen  in  terms  of  a  failure  to  meet  the  conditions 
required  for  the  arousal  of  dissonance,  because 
of  the  coercive  methods  used  to  obtain  com- 
pliance  with  the  scheme.  And  even  if dissonance 
is  aroused.  the  purely  temporary  nature  of  rural 
service  means  that  behavioral  commitment  to  it 
by  the  visiting  doctor  is  likely  to  be  entirely 
lacking.  Consequently,  what  dissonance  is 
aroused.  will  not  be  reduced  by  the  adoption  of  a 
more  favorable  attitude  to  the  conditions  of  this 
service. 
(e)  Iwtrrnutioml  relrrtiorls: fbrc~i~tl  uid umi  IMF 
cotiditionulit~ 
So  far.  all  of  our  examples  have  been  drawn 
from  a  situation  in  which  the  government  of  a 
developing  country  has  sought  to  alter  the 
behavior  and  attitudes  of  society.  But  there  are 
also  numerous  areas  in  which  it  is  the  behavior/ 
attitudes  of  the  government  itself  which  are  the 
object  of  attempts  at  change. 
Hirschman  has  pointed  to  the  use  of  foreign 
aid  as  one  such  instrument  of  influence  on  the 
policies  of  Third  World  governments.  Specific- 
ally,  he  shows  how  the  very  operation  of  the 
forced  compliance  principle  makes  it  difficult  for 
donors  to  use  aid  as  an  effective  means  of 
influencing  change  on  the  part  of  unwilling  aid 
recipients.  As  he  puts  it, 
The  conditioning  of  foreign  ;tid on  internal  rclorm 
can do  positive  harm  at the  stage  when  ;m underde- ATTITUDE  CHANGE  REVISITED  1147 
veloped  country  is  about  to  commit  herself  to  new 
types  of  “modern”  or  reform  actions;  to  reward 
such  perhaps  partly  dissonant  behavior  would  lead 
to  less  cumulative  change  than  if the  behavior  could 
not  be  dismissed  by  the  actors  as  something  they  did 
just  to  get  hold  of  the  aid  funds.  In  this  way,  the 
theory  throws  some  light  on  the  difficulties  of  using 
aid  as  a  means  of  promoting  internal  reform  which 
have  beset  the  Alliance  for  Progress  since  its 
inception.4’ 
A  very  similar  argument  can  be  made  in  the 
case  of  IMF  conditionality,  which,  according  to 
Dell,  has  become  much  more  exacting  since  the 
mid-1970s44  (and  hence  much  less  likely  to  exert 
any  lasting  influence  over  recipients).  And,  in 
fact,  one  commentator  has  very  recently  ob- 
served  that  “even  where  governments  accept  the 
economic  wisdom  of  the  Fund  prescriptions,  it 
may  prove  politically  more  convenient  for  them 
to  present  the  policies  as  ‘Fund  policies’  which 
have  been  unwillingly  forced  on  them.“”  As  a 
consequence  of  this  forced  compliance,  one 
would  expect  to  find  a diminished  commitment  to 
the  policies,  and  an  associated  tendency  to 
“reversion  behavior”  rather  than  a  reform  of 
attitudes.  It  is  interesting,  therefore  (if  not  at  all 
conclusive),  to  discover  that  in  Latin  America, 
after  about  25 years  of  Fund-assisted  stabilization 
policies  the  region’s  performance  has  not  improved 
and  local  economic  policy-makers  have  not 
learnt  how  to  emancipate  themselves  from 
disproportionate  reliance  on  adjustment  assistance 
from  outside  agencies.  On  the  contrary  the  more 
advanced  economies  have  manifested  increasing 
symptoms  of  “Latin  American”  style  economic 
instability.“h 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
A  vast  literature  attests  to  the  essentiality  of 
attitude  change  in the  process  of  development.  In 
almost  all  this  literature  a  change  in  attitudes  is 
regarded  as  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  the  type 
of  behavioral  changes  that  are  thought  to  pro- 
duce  economic  development.  Almost  20  years 
ago,  however,  Hirschman  pointed  out  that  this 
sequence  may  not  in  fact  be  necessary,  and 
indeed,  that  according  to  the  social  psychological 
theory  of  cognitive  dissonance  the  reverse  may 
occur  (that  is,  favorable  attitude  change  may  be 
the  result  rather  than  the  cause  of  alterations  in 
behavior).  Because  Hirschman  did  not,  however, 
deal  with  the  conditions  that  are  required  for  this 
reversal  of  the  traditional  sequence  to  occur,  we 
have  tried  to  extend  his  analysis  to  incorporate  a 
specification  of  the  conditions  laid  down  by 
dissonance  theory.  In  addition,  we  have  sought 
to  show  that  numerous  instances  of  success  and 
failure  in  policies  designed  to  promote  attitude 
change  in  the  Third  World  can  plausibly  be 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  these  conditions.  To 
the  extent  that  our  interpretations  are  valid,  a 
number  of  powerful  implications  for  the  design  of 
development  policy  emerge  from  the  analysis.  To 
be  more  specific,  policy-makers  will  have  to  pay 
especially  close  attention  to  the  subtle  psycholog- 
ical  requirements  for  bringing  about  counter- 
attitudinal  behavior  with  a  minimum  amount  of 
perceived  pressure. 
In  assessing  the  validity  of  our  interpretations, 
the  reader  should  recognize  that  underlying  these 
is  the  assumption  that  cognitive  dissonance 
theory  is  “universally  correct.”  That  is to  say,  we 
have  implicitly  assumed  not  only  that  the  theory 
is  applicable  to  the  modern  Western  type  of 
society  for  which  it  was  originally  intended,  but 
also  that  it  is  largely  transferable  to  the  often 
traditional  societies  of  the  Third  World.  With 
respect  to  the  former,  we  can  do  no  better  than 
refer  the  reader  to  the  specialized  experimental 
evidence.47  The  case  for  the  transferability  of  the 
theory  seems  to  us  to  depend  on  whether  the 
human  need  for  cognitive  consistency  can  really 
be  placed  on  the  same  footing  as  the  basic  human 
instincts  for  hunger,  thirst,  etc.  (as  Festinger 
suggested  in  his  original  formulation),  and  if  so, 
on  the  extent  to  which  even  these  drives  are 
capable  of  being  modified  by  different 
environments.4x 
1.  Akerlof  and  Dickens  (1982). 
2.  Hirschman  (1965,  1970,  1971,  1981,  1982). 
3.  Hirschman  (1965),  p.  392. 
4.  Ibid..  pp.  392-393  (emphasis  added). 
s.  Brehm  and  Cohen  (1962),  p.  272. 
NOTES 
6.  Wicklund  and  Brehm  (1976). 
7.  Brehm  and  Cohen  (1962),  p.  280. 
8.  Hirschman  (1970).  pp.  146-147,  attempts  to 
identify  the  conditions  for  different  responses  to 
dissonant  situations  on  the  part  of  group  members.  The 
dissonance  aroused  is  a  consequence  of  the  difference 
between  the  “cognition  that  (one)  has  undergone  an 1148  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT 
unpleasant  ordeal  to  attain  membership  and  the  cogni- 
tion  concerning  the  undesirable  aspects  of  the  group.” 
As  a  mode  of  dissonance  reduction,  “exit”  is  likely  to 
occur  when  the  costs  of  exit  are  low.  which  may  he 
partly  a  consequence  of  the  lower  dissonance  that  is 
aroused  by  a  “mild  initiation  to  the  group.” 





















Ibid.,  p.  283. 
Hare  (1976). 
Ibid.,  p.  53. 
Whyte  (1974),  p.  49  (emphasis  added). 
Freedman  and  Fraser  (1966).  p.  lY5. 
Brehm  and  Cohen  (1962),  pp.  284-285 
Ibid.,  p.  284  (emphasis  added). 
Bruce  ( 1980). 
Zeidenstein  (1980). 
Huber  and  Khan  (1970). 
Anderson  and  Bowman  (1971),  p.  305. 
Rogers  (1971).  p.  246. 
Ibid.,  p.  247. 
Knight  (1980). 
Orleans  (1975),  p.  503. 
Ibid.,  p.  515. 
Ibid.,  p.  525. 
Whyte  (1974). 




















Ibid..  p.  17. 
Ibid.,  p.  231. 
Elmendorf  and  Buckles  (1YXO).  p.  20. 
Ibid.,  pp.  19-20  (emphasis  added). 
Ibid.,  p. 20. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.,  p.  14. 
Ellman  (197S),  p.  333. 
Ibid. 
Ibid..  p.  350. 
Turok  (1975),  p.  407. 
Ibid..  p.  415. 
IL0  (1970).  p.  256. 
Oftedal  and  Levinson  (1977).  p.  410. 
Hirschman  (1965).  p.  393. 
Dell  (1981). 
Bird  (1984).  p.  176. 
Foxley  and  Whitehead  (1980),  p.  825. 
See  for  example  Wicklund  and  Brehm  (1976)  and 
Margulis  and  Songer  (1969) 
48.  A  similar  question  arises  in  relation  to  the 
universality  of  major  elements  of  Freudian  psychoan- 
alytic  theory.  In  this  regard  Erich  Fromm  (1978).  p. 
163,  has  argued  that  “the  instinctual  apparatus.  both 
quantitativelv  and  qualitativelv,  has  certain 
physiologically  and  biologically  determined  limits  to  its 
modifiability  and  that  only  within  these  limits  is  it 
subject  to  the  influence  of  social  factors.” 
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